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Report as Commander of the Second Corps, HDQRS. SECOND CORPS, ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, May 6, 1863.
From: http://cavalry.km.ru GENERAL: I have the honor to submit, in advance of a detailed report,, the following narrative of events connected with the battle of the Wilderness (May 2), and of Chancellorsville (May 3), and events following: This corps, under its immortal leader, Lieutenant-General [T. J.] Jackson, attacked the enemy on his light, turning his right flank by the Turnpike road at Melzi Chancellor's, 2 miles above Chancellorsville, making the attack late in the evening, after an arduous and necessarily circuitous march from the Plank road, 2 miles below Chancellorsville. The enemy had a fine position, and, if time had been given him to recover from his first surprise and mass troops on that front, it would have been a difficult task to dislodge them; but Jackson's entire corps, both when marching and when in position, had been purposely screened from view by the cavalry of Fitzhugh Lee's brigade, an important duty which he performed with great skill and address. The attack was thus in a measure a surprise. The enemy's line of intrenchments was carried, and his legions driven in confusion from the field. It was already dark when I sought General Jackson, and proposed, as there appeared nothing else for me to do, to take some cavalry and infantry over and hold the Ely's Ford road. He approved the proposition, and I had already gained the heights overlooking the ford, where was a large number of camp-fires, when Captain [R. H. T.] Adams, of General A. P. Hill's staff, reached me post-haste, and informed me of the sad calamities which for the time deprived the troops of the leadership of both Jackson and Hill, and the urgent demand for me to come and take command as quickly as possible. I rode with rapidity back 5 miles, determined to press the pursuit already so gloriously begun. General Jackson had gone to the rear, but General A. P. Hill was still on the ground, and formally turned over the command to me. I sent also a staff officer to General Jackson to inform him that I would cheerfully carry out any instructions he would give, and proceeded immediately to the front, which I reached at 10 p.m. I found, upon reaching it, A. P. Hill's division in front, under Heth, with Lane's, McGowan's, Archer's, and Heth's brigades on the right of the road, within half a mile of Chancellorsville, near the apex of the ridge, and Pender's and Thomas' on the left. I found that the enemy had made an attack on our right flank, but were repulsed. The fact, however, that the attack was made, and at night, made the apprehensive of a repetition of it, and necessitated throwing back the right wing, so as to meet it. I was also informed that there was much confusion on the right, owing to the fact that some troops mistook friends for the enemy and fired upon them. Knowing that an advance under such circumstances would be extremely hazardous, much against my inclination, I felt bound to wait for daylight. General Jackson had also sent me word to use my own discretion. The commanding general was with the right wing of the army, with which I had no communication except by a very circuitous and uncertain route. I nevertheless sent a dispatch to inform him of the state of affairs, and rode around the lines restoring order, imposing silence, and making arrangements for the attack early next day. I sent Col. E. P. Alexander, senior officer of artillery, to select and occupy with artillery positions along the line bearing upon the enemy's position, with which duty he was engaged all night. At early dawn, Trimble's division composed the second line and Rodes' division the third. The latter had his rations on the spot, and, as his men were entirely without food, was extremely anxious to issue. I was disposed to wait a short time for this purpose; but when, as preliminary to an attack, I ordered the right of the first line to swing around and come perpendicular to the road, the order was misunderstood for an order to attack, and that part of the line became engaged. I ordered the whole line to advance and the second and third lines to follow. As the sun lifted the mist that shrouded the field, it was discovered that the ridge on the extreme right was a fine position for concentrating artillery. I immediately ordered thirty pieces to that point, and, under the happy effects of the battalion system, it was done quickly. The effect of this fire upon the enemy's batteries was superb. In the meantime the enemy was pressing our left with infantry, and all the re-enforcements I could obtain were sent there. Colquitt's brigade, of Trimble's division, ordered first to the right, was directed to the left to support Pender. Iverson's brigade, of the second line, was also engaged there, and the three lines were more or less merged into one line of battle, and reported hard pressed. Urgent requests were sent for re-enforcements, and notices that the troops were out of ammunition, &c. I ordered that the ground must be held at all hazards; if necessary, with the bayonet. About this time also our right connected with Anderson's left, relieving all anxiety on that subject. I was now anxious to mass infantry on the left, to push the enemy there, and sent every available regiment to that point. About 8 a.m. the works of the enemy directly in front of our right were stormed, but the enemy's forces retiring from the line facing Anderson, which our batteries enfiladed, caused our troops to abandon these works, the enemy coming in their rear. It was stormed a second time, when I discovered the enemy making a flank movement to the left of the road, for the purpose of dislodging our forces, and hastened to change the front of a portion of our line to meet this attack, but the shortness of the time and the deafening roar of artillery prevented the execution of this movement, and our line again retired. The third time it was taken, I made disposition of a portion of Ramseur's brigade to protect the left flank. Artillery was pushed forward to the crest, sharpshooters were posted in a house in advance, and in a few moments Chancellorsville was ours (10 a.m.). The enemy retired toward Ely's Ford, the road to United States Ford branching one-half mile west of Chancellorsville. In this hotly contested battle the enemy had strong works on each side of the road, those on the commanding ridge being heavily defended by artillery. The night also had given him time to mass his troops to meet this attack, but the desperate valor of Jackson's corps overcame every obstacle and drove the enemy to his new line of defense, which his engineers had constructed in his rear, ready for occupation, at the intersection of the Ely's Ford and United States Ford roads. General Anderson's division, of the right wing, arrived upon the field comparatively fresh. I set about reforming my command with a view to a renewal of the attack, when the commanding general received intelligence that the enemy had crossed at Fredericksburg and taken Marye's Hill. An aide-de-camp of General Sedgwick, captured by Colonel [Williams C.] Wickham's regiment on the right, near Banks' Ford, reported two corps under command of Sedgwick. The commanding general decided to hold Hooker, beaten as he was, in his works with Jackson's corps, and detach enough of other forces to turn on Sedgwick. The success of this strategy enabled him again to concentrate to force Hooker's position, and arrangements were made for attack with this corps on the morning of the 6th (Wednesday); but before it was begun our skirmishers found the enemy's works abandoned, and, pressing forward to the river, captured many prisoners. The enemy had another work 2 miles in rear of the other, which was also abandoned. This region of country is known as the “Wilderness.” Rapid pursuit in such a country is an impossibility where the enemy takes care to leave his trains beyond the Rappahannock, and avails himself, as he does, of the appliances of art, labor, and natural obstacles to delay his pursuers. In this battle, in which the enemy's main force was attacked in chosen positions, he was driven entirely from the field and finally fled across the river. Our troops behaved with the greatest heroism. I desire to call the attention of the commanding general to the fact that I was called to the command, at 10 o'clock at night, on the battlefield, of the corps d'armée led so long by the immortal Jackson, in the midst of a night attack made by the enemy, without any knowledge of the ground, the position of our forces, or the plans thus far pursued, and without an officer left in the corps above the rank of brigadier-general. Under these disadvantages the attack was renewed the next morning and prosecuted to a successful issue. Maj. Gen. A. P. Hill, who had the misfortune to be wounded soon after the command devolved upon him, remained near the field next day, notwithstanding his wound, for which I was very grateful, for circumstances might have arisen making his presence necessary. To the generals of divisions and brigades I feel greatly indebted for the hearty co-operation, zeal, and support accorded to me by all to the fullest extent of their ability. The field officers and others I hope to particularize hereafter in a detailed report when the data is collected, as well as mention specially the various officers serving on my staff with marked distinction during the day. I labored under great disadvantages in having none of General Jackson's staff with me until after the action began, and then only Maj. A. S. Pendleton, who, however, behaved with great heroism and efficiency when he did join me. Our losses were heavy; the enemy's heavier. In Sunday's battle, Brigadier Generals Ramseur, Heth, and McGowan were wounded and Paxton killed. Heth and Ramseur, though painfully wounded, persisted in retaining command to the close of the fight. Their heroic conduct will be specially mentioned in the report proper. The casualties of the corps I have not the means of knowing, as before the returns were completed I relinquished the command to Maj. Gen. A. P. Hill, in pursuance to the orders of the commanding general; but the division and brigade commanders were ordered to submit through me their reports of the battle of Chancellorsville. The cavalry was well managed by Brig. Gen. Fitz Lee, who seized Ely's Ford and held the road to within 2 miles of Chancellorsville, driving the enemy's cavalry from the former place. His men, without rations or forage, displayed a heroism rarely met with under any circumstances, and, guarding the two flanks, accomplished an indispensable part of the great success which God vouchsafed to us. I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant, J. E. B. STUART, Major-General, Commanding. Brig. Gen. R. H. CHILTON, Asst. Adjt. and Insp. Gen., Hdqrs. Army of Northern Va -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Report as Commander of the Cavalry Division HDQRS. CAV. DIV., ARMY OF NORTHERN VA., May 8, 1863. GENERAL: In anticipation of the detailed reports, I have the honor to submit the following sketch of the operations of the cavalry immediately preceding and during the battles of the Wilderness and Chancellorsville: The enemy had more than a week previously concentrated a large body of cavalry (two or three divisions) along the line of the Upper Rappahannock, whose attempts to hold a footing on the south bank of that river had been repulsed with loss by the two brigades with me, commanded, respectively, by Brig. Gens. Fitzhugh and William H. F. Lee. Finally infantry appeared at Kelly's Ford and Rappahannock Bridge, but were so inactive that thus far there was nothing inconsistent with the supposition that their appearance was a feint. About dark, however, on Tuesday night, April 28, the enemy crossed below the bend of the river at Kelly's [Ford] in boats opposite our vedettes, and before the force posted to defend the ford could be sent to that point, had crossed in such numbers as to make any attempt at resistance futile. The party crossing at once threw over a pontoon bridge, and moved directly up the river, compelling our forces to abandon the ford at Kelly's, and severing our communication with the lower pickets. General W. H. F. Lee, near Brandy [Station], on receiving this intelligence, sent a regiment (Thirteenth Virginia Cavalry) at once to meet the advance of infantry, which was checked a mile above Kelly's [Ford]. I received information of this move about 9 p.m. at Culpeper, and made arrangements to have the entire cavalry and artillery force in Culpeper on the ground at daylight the next morning, directing in the meantime that the enemy be so enveloped with pickets as to see what route he took from Kelly's [Ford] and keep him in check. A Belgian officer of General Carl Schurz's staff was captured, who represented that the Eleventh Corps was certainly across; how much more was to follow he could not tell, but thought that the force altogether in this column was about 20,000. He seemed frank and honest, as well as communicative. General W. H. F. Lee selected a fine position between Brandy [Station] and Kelly's [Ford], and awaited the advance, General Fitz. Lee being held in reserve at Brandy [Station], with a regiment at Stevens-burg. The enemy did not make a serious advance toward our position, though [Col. John R.] Chambliss, jr., with the Thirteenth Virginia, was skirmishing all the forenoon with the enemy's infantry. About 1 p.m. I received a report from the pickets toward Madden's that the enemy was moving a large infantry force in that direction. Leaving Chambliss in front of the enemy, where I then was, I marched the remainder of the command (Fitz. Lee in advance) directly to Madden's, where we pierced the enemy's column while marching, and scattered it, taking possession of the road and capturing a number of prisoners, which enabled us to develop their strength and designs, as we captured prisoners from three army corps--the Eleventh ([General O. O.] Howard's), Twelfth ([General H. W.] Slocum's), and Fifth ([General George G.] Meade's), and soon after learned that the column had marched direct for Germanna Ford. These items were telegraphed to the commanding general. Col. J. Lucius Davis, near Beaver Dam, had been telegraphed early that day to move his forces at once to occupy and hold the Rapidan fords, but I had no assurance that the order would be obeyed with sufficient promptness to accomplish the object, and as there was no cavalry on the left flank of the main army, it was indispensably necessary to move round to get in front of the enemy moving down upon Fredericksburg, delay him as much as possible, and protect our left flank; besides, while in the execution of this design, I received instructions from the commanding general to give necessary orders about public property along the railroad, and swing around to join his left wing, delaying the enemy as much as possible in his march. The brigade of General Fitz. Lee was put en route, in a jaded and hungry condition, to Raccoon Ford, to cross and move around to the enemy's front. General W. H. F. Lee, with the two regiments (the Ninth and Thirteenth [Virginia]) under his command, was directed to move by way of Culpeper, to take up the line of the Upper Rapidan, and look out for Gordonsville and the railroad. Couriers had been, by direction, sent to Ely's and Germanna [Fords] to notify our parties there of the enemy's advance, but were captured; consequently the parties at those points received no notice. However, by the good management of Captain [C. R.] Collins (now major Fifteenth Virginia Cavalry), the enemy was checked for some time at Germanna [Ford], and his wagons and implements saved, though some of his men were captured. A strong party of sharpshooters was left to hold the road of the enemy's march as long as possible, and then follow on, which was done, the party maintaining their position until 11 o'clock at night, when the enemy advanced and compelled them to retire. Dispatches captured showed that trains of wagons and droves of cattle accompanied the expedition, and the men were already supplied with five days' rations in haversacks. These items placed it beyond doubt that the enemy was making a real movement to turn Fredericksburg. Crossing the Rapidan that night, the main body of cavalry was halted to rest a few hours, having marched more than half the night, and one regiment (Colonel [Thomas H.] Owen's) was sent on to get between the enemy and Fredericksburg and impede his progress. Early the next day (Thursday, April 30), Owen having reached the Germanna road on the Fredericksburg side, kept in the enemy's front, while the remainder kept on the enemy's right flank, opened on his column at Wilderness Tavern, delaying his march until 12 m., causing several regiments of infantry to deploy in line of battle to meet us. Hearing that the enemy had already reached Chancellorsville by the Ely's Ford road, I directed my march by Todd's Tavern for Spotsylvania Court-House. Night overtook us at Todd's Tavern, and, anxious to know what the commanding general desired me to do further, I left the command to bivouac here, and proceeded with my staff toward his headquarters, near Fredericksburg, but had not proceeded a mile before we found ourselves confronted by a party of the enemy, double our own, directly in our path. I sent back hastily for a regiment, which, coming up (Fifth Virginia Cavalry, Colonel [T. L.] Rosser), attacked and routed the party, but in the meantime another body of the enemy's cavalry came in rear of the Fifth. Receiving notice of this, I gave orders to withdraw the Fifth from the road, and sent for the brigade to push on at once. This was done, and by the bright moonlight a series of charges routed and scattered this expedition, which had penetrated to within a mile or two of Spotsylvania Court-House. It has been since ascertained that this expedition was by no means an insignificant affair, and but for the timely arrival of this cavalry on the spot, and its prompt and vigorous action, might have resulted disastrously. Artillery as well as trains were passing Spotsylvania unprotected at the time. With very little rest, without waiting for rations or forage, this noble little brigade, under its incomparable leader, were in the saddle early the next morning, and moving on Jackson's left flank during the entire day (May 1), swinging around to the left to threaten the enemy's rear. On the morning of May 2, the cavalry of this brigade was disposed so as to clear Jackson's way in turning the enemy's right flank, and to cover the movement of this corps, masking it on its right flank. This was done most successfully, driving off the enemy's cavalry whenever it appeared and enabled Jackson to surprise the enemy In the subsequent operations attending the battle and the glorious victory the cavalry did most essential service in watching our flanks and holding the Ely's Ford road in the enemy's rear, Wickham and Owen being on the extreme right. The Horse Artillery kept pace with the infantry in the battle of the Wilderness, leading the attack of artillery. Too much praise cannot be awarded the brave men who thus bore fatigue, hunger, loss of sleep, and danger without a murmur. The operations of Brig. Gen. W. H. F. Lee, with his handful of men, are embraced in the memoranda furnished by him. His report is not only satisfactory, but gives evidence of sagacity and good conduct throughout, and of great efficiency on the part of his command. The result shows that the disposition made of these two commands was absolutely necessary. Jones' brigade was entirely out of reach, and Hampton was south of James River, recruiting. That Stoneman, with a large cavalry force, was allowed to penetrate into the heart of the State, though comparatively harmless in results, is due to the entire inadequacy in numbers of the cavalry of the Army of Northern Virginia. The enemy has confronted us with at least three divisions of cavalry, more or less concentrated, which we oppose with one division, spread from the Chesapeake to the Alleghany; yet had not the approach of a battle below made it necessary to divide the force of the two Lees, I feel very confident that Stoneman's advance would have been prevented, though with great sacrifice of life, owing to disparity of numbers. In this report I have endeavored to describe the various operations of the cavalry without detailing the results of the various contests. With the commanding general, who is aware of all the facts, we are content to rest our vindication, if the pursuit of the plain path of duty need vindication. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, J. E. B. STUART, Major-General, Commanding. Brig. Gen. R. H. CHILTON, Asst. Adjt. and Insp. Gen., Hdqrs. Army of Northern Va Source: War of the Rebellion - The Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies Thanks to Tim Harrison and The American Civil War - The Struggle To Preserve The Union |
